

be sought after by our officials like other criminals. We order that those who become known by an inquisition [trial], even if they are touched by the evidence of a slight suspicion, should be examined by ecclesiastics and prelates. If they should be found by them to deviate from the Catholic faith in the least wise, and if, after they have been admonished by them in a pastoral way, they should be unwilling to relinquish the insidious darkness of the Devil and to recognize the God of Light, but they persist in the constancy of conceived error, we order by the promulgation of our present law that these Patarines should be condemned to suffer the death for which they

strive. Committed to the judgment of the flames, they should be burned alive in the sight of the people. We do not grieve that in this we satisfy their desire, from which they obtain punishment alone and no other fruit of their error. No one should presume to intervene with us in behalf of such persons. But if anyone does, we shall turn against him the deserved stings of our indignation. . . .

. . . We order that the shelterers, believers, accomplices of Patarines, and those who support them in any way at all, who give no heed to fear for themselves so that they can protect others from punishment, should be sent into perpetual exile and all their goods confiscated.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Why were the Waldensian teachings so threatening to the clergy of the Catholic Church?
2. How did Frederick II view heretics and what methods did he determine to use to eliminate them?

5 Medieval Learning: Synthesis of Reason and Christian Faith

The twelfth century witnessed a revived interest in classical learning and the founding of universities. Traditional theology was broadened by the application of a new system of critical analysis, called scholasticism. Scholastic thinkers assumed that some teachings of Christianity, which they accepted as true by faith, could also be demonstrated to be true by reason. They sought to explain and clarify theological doctrines by subjecting them to logical analysis.

Adelard of Bath

A QUESTIONING SPIRIT

In the High and Late Middle Ages, ancient scientific texts, particularly the works of Aristotle, were translated from Greek and Arabic into Latin. Influenced by Aristotle's naturalistic and empirical approach, several medieval scholars devoted greater attention to investigating the natural world. An early exponent of this emerging scientific outlook was Adelard of Bath (c. 1080–

c. 1145). Born in England, Adelard studied in France and traveled in Muslim lands, becoming an advocate of Arabic science.

Adelard's *Natural Questions* was written before the major Greek works were translated into Latin and made available to western European scholars. But it does show a growing curiosity and a questioning spirit, attitudes that are crucial to scientific thinking. *Natural Questions* is a dialogue between Adelard and his nephew; reproduced below are some of Adelard's responses to his nephew's queries.

ADELARD I take nothing away from God, for whatever exists is from Him and because of Him. But the natural order does not exist confusedly and without rational arrangement, and human reason should be listened to concerning those things it treats of. But when it completely fails, then the matter should be referred to God. Therefore, since we have not yet completely lost the use of our minds, let us return to reason. . . .

. . . It is difficult for me to talk with you about animals, for I have learned one thing, under the guidance of reason, from Arabic teachers; but you, captivated by a show of authority, are led around by a halter. For what should we call authority but a halter? Indeed, just as brute animals are led about by a halter wherever you please, and are not told where or why, but see the rope by which they are held and follow it alone, thus the authority of writers leads many of you, caught and bound by animal-like credulity, into danger. Whence some men, usurping the name of authority for themselves, have employed great license in writing, to such an extent that they do not hesitate to present the false as true to such animal-like men. For why not fill up sheets of paper, and why not write on the back too, when you usually have such readers today who require no rational explanation and put their trust only in the ancient name of a title? For they do not understand that reason has been given to each person so that he might discern the true from the false, using reason as the chief judge. For if reason were not the universal judge, it would have been given to each of us in vain. It would be sufficient that it were given to one (or a few

at most), and the rest would be content with their authority and decisions. Further, those very people who are called authorities only secured the trust of their successors because they followed reason; and whoever is ignorant of reason or ignores it is deservedly considered to be blind. I will cut short this discussion of the fact that in my judgment authority should be avoided. But I do assert this, that first we ought to seek the reason for anything, and then if we find an authority it may be added. Authority alone cannot make a philosopher believe anything, nor should it be adduced for this purpose. . . .

NEPHEW One should listen to what you say but not believe it. But I shall gird myself for higher things, so that, as far as my little knowledge permits, light might come forth from the smoke. For although I am ignorant of the Greeks' boasts, and I have not seen Vulcan's cave (i.e., Mt. Aetna), nevertheless I have learned both to know what is true and to disprove what is false, and I have considerable skill in this. So continue! I want to find out what you think about human nature. For although you may consider what you have already said to be very important, nevertheless, if you do not know yourself, I think that your remarks have little value. For men ought most properly to investigate man. . . .

ADELARD I believe that man is dearer to the Creator than all the other animals. Nevertheless it does not happen that he is born with natural weapons or is suited for swift flight. But he has something which is much better and more worthy, reason I mean, by which he so far excels the brutes that by means of it he

can tame them, put bits in their mouths, and train them to perform various tasks. You see, therefore, by how much the gift of reason excels bodily defenses. . . .

NEPHEW Since we have been discussing things having to do with the brain, explain, if you can, how the philosophers determined the physical location of imagination, reason and memory. For both Aristotle in the *Physics* (an erroneous reference) and other philosophers in other works, have been able to determine that the operations of imagination are carried on in the front part of the brain, reason in the middle, and memory in the back, and so they have given these three areas the names imaginative, rational and memorial. But by what skill were they able to determine the site of each operation of the mind and to assign to each small area of the brain its proper function, since these operations cannot be perceived by any sense?

ADELARD To one who does not understand, everything seems impossible: but when things are understood, everything becomes clear. I would guess that whoever first undertook this task learned something about it from sense experience. Probably, someone who had formerly had a very active imagination suffered an injury to the front of his head and afterwards no longer possessed the imaginative faculty, although his reason and memory remained unaffected. And when this happened it was noticed by the philosopher. And similarly injuries to other parts of the head impeded other functions of the mind so that it could be established with certainty which areas of the brain controlled which mental functions, especially since in some men these areas are marked by very fine lines. Therefore, from evidence of this sort, which could be perceived by the senses, an insensible and intellectual operation of the mind has been made clear.

Peter Abelard INQUIRY INTO DIVERGENT VIEWS OF CHURCH FATHERS

Dialectics, a method of logical analysis applied to the Bible and the writings of early Christian thinkers, was brilliantly taught by Peter Abelard (1079–1142) in the cathedral school at Paris. In his book *Sic et Non (Yes and No)*, Abelard listed some hundred and fifty questions on which the early church authorities had taken differing positions over the centuries. He suggested that these issues could be resolved by the careful application of the dialectical method to the language of the texts.

Although he never intended to challenge the Christian faith, Abelard raised, with his critical scrutiny, fears that the dialectical approach would undermine faith and foster heresy. Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, a Cistercian monk and mystic, challenged the new methods of the Parisian professor and sought to silence him. In 1141, Abelard was forced to quit his teaching post, and he retired to a monastery, where he died the following year. Despite Bernard's apparent victory, the new scholastic rationalistic approach swept the schools of Europe. In the following reading, the critical use of rational methods in textual analysis is described by Abelard.

We must be careful not to be led astray by attributing views to the [Church] Fathers which they did not hold. This may happen if a wrong author's name is given to a book or if a text is corrupt. For many works are falsely attributed to one of the Fathers to give them authority, and some passages, even in the Bible, are corrupt through the errors of copyists. . . . We must be equally careful to make sure that an opinion quoted from a Father was not withdrawn or corrected by him in the light of later and better knowledge. . . . Again the passage in question may not give the Father's own opinion, but that of some other writer whom he is quoting. . . .

We must also make a thorough inquiry when different decisions are given on the same matter under canon [church] law. We must discover the underlying purpose of the opinion, whether it is meant to grant an indulgence or exhort to some perfection. In this way we may clear up the apparent contradiction. . . . If the opinion is a definitive judgment, we must determine whether it is of general application or directed to a particular case. . . . The when and why of the order must also be considered because what is allowed at one time is often forbidden at another, and what is often laid

down as the strict letter of the law may be sometimes moderated by a dispensation. . . .

Furthermore we customarily talk of things as they appear to our bodily senses and not as they are in actual fact. So judging by what we see we say it is a starry sky or it is not, and that the sun is hot or has no heat at all, when these things though variable in appearance are ever constant. Can we be surprised, then, that some matters have been stated by the Fathers as opinions rather than the truth? Then again many controversies would be quickly settled if we could be on our guard against a particular word used in different senses by different authors. . . .

A careful reader will employ all these ways of reconciling contradictions in the writings of the Fathers. But if the contradictions are so glaring that they cannot be reconciled, then the rival authorities must be compared and the view that has the heaviest backing be adopted. . . .

By collecting contrasting divergent opinions I hope to provoke young readers to push themselves to the limit in the search for truth, so that their wits may be sharpened by their investigation. It is by doubting that we come to investigate, and by investigating that we recognise the truth.

Saint Thomas Aquinas *SUMMA THEOLOGICA* *AND SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

For most of the Middle Ages, religious thought was dominated by the influence of Saint Augustine (d. 430), the greatest of the Latin church fathers (see page 191). Augustine placed little value on the study of nature; for him, the City of Man (the world) was a sinful place from which people tried to escape in order to enter the City of God (heaven). Regarding God as the source of knowing, he held that reason by itself was an inadequate guide to knowledge: without faith in revealed truth, there could be no understanding. An alternative approach to that of Augustine was provided by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), a friar of the Order of Preachers (Dominicans), who taught theology at Paris and later in Italy. Both Augustine and Aquinas believed that God was the source of all truth, that human nature was corrupted by the imprint of the original sin

of Adam and Eve, and that God revealed himself through the Bible and in the person of Jesus Christ. But, in contrast to Augustine, Aquinas expressed great confidence in the power of reason and favored applying it to investigate the natural world.

Aquinas held that as both faith and reason came from God, they were not in opposition to each other; properly understood, they supported each other. Because reason was no enemy of faith, it should not be feared. In addition to showing renewed respect for reason, Aquinas—influenced by Aristotelian empiricism (the acquisition of knowledge of nature through experience)—valued knowledge of the natural world. He saw the natural and supernatural worlds not as irreconcilable and hostile to each other, but as a continuous ascending hierarchy of divinely created orders of being moving progressively toward the Supreme Being. In constructing a synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelianism, Aquinas gave renewed importance to the natural world, human reason, and the creative human spirit. Nevertheless, by holding that reason was subordinate to faith, he remained a typically medieval thinker. In the following reading from his most ambitious work, the *Summa Theologica*, Thomas Aquinas uses the categories of Aristotelian philosophy to demonstrate through natural reason God's existence. Also included is a selection from another work, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, a theological defense of Christian doctrines that relies extensively on natural reason.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

Third Article: Whether God Exists?

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore

impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, *i.e.*, that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,

and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to be corrupted, and consequently, it is possible for them to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which can not-be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to exist only through something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the graduation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But *more* and *less* are predicated of

different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is most being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being. . . . Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. . . . Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

The next reading shows Aquinas' great respect for reason. He defines a human being by the capacity to regulate actions through reason and will.

Sixth Article: Does Man Choose with Necessity or Freely?

I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. . . . For man can will and not will, act and not act . . . can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason for this is to be found in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can apprehend as good not only this, viz., *to will* or *to act*, but also this,

viz., *not to will* and *not to act*. Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider the nature of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the nature of an evil; and in this way, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. . . . Therefore, man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.

In the following selection Aquinas stresses the necessity of assenting to the truths of faith even if they are beyond the grasp of reason.

SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

A still further benefit may also be seen in what Aristotle says in the *Ethics*. There was a certain Simonides who exhorted people to put aside the knowledge of divine things and to apply their talents to human occupations. He said that "he who is a man should know human things, and he who is mortal, things that are mortal." Against Simonides Aristotle says that "man should draw himself towards what is immortal and divine as much as he can." And so he says in the *De animalibus* that, although what we know of the higher substances is very little, yet that little is loved and desired more than all the knowledge that we have about less noble substances. He also says in the *De caelo et mundo* that when questions about the heavenly

bodies can be given even a modest and merely plausible solution, he who hears this experiences intense joy. From all these considerations it is clear that even the most imperfect knowledge about the most noble realities brings the greatest perfection to the soul. Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great perfection for itself.

Therefore it is written: "For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men" (Ecclus. 3:25). . . .

Those who place their faith in this truth, however, "for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence," do not believe foolishly, as though "following artificial fables" (II Peter 1:16). For these "secrets of divine Wisdom" (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the raising of the dead. . . . [A]nd what is more wonderful, there is the inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest eloquence. When these arguments were examined [in Roman times], . . . in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect, the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible. Now, that this has happened . . . as a

result of the disposition of God, is clear from the fact that through many pronouncements of the ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The books of these prophets are held in veneration among us Christians, since they give witness to our faith.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What ideas of Adelard of Bath encouraged further scientific study of the natural world in the Middle Ages?
2. Describe the methods of literary analysis promoted by Peter Abelard in his courses on rhetoric and logic at the University of Paris.
3. Why did Abelard's new methods of textual analysis create so much controversy?
4. Show how Thomas Aquinas used both logic and an empirical method to prove the existence of God.
5. What is the ethical and legal significance of Thomas Aquinas' argument that man is free to choose his course of action?

6 Medieval Universities

The twelfth century witnessed a revival of classical learning and cultural creativity. New inventions in engineering and technology produced the first Gothic-style cathedrals; new styles of classical inspiration began to influence sculpture, painting, and literature; new Latin translations of Greek philosophical and scientific texts stimulated scholars; the reintroduction of the study of Roman law began to influence political theory and institutions. These were some of the major changes that would leave a permanent mark on subsequent Western culture.

A significant achievement of this age was the emergence of universities. Arising spontaneously among teachers of the liberal arts and students of the higher studies of law, theology, and medicine, the universities gave more formal and lasting institutional structure to the more advanced levels of schooling. The medieval universities were largely dedicated to educating young men for careers as lawyers, judges, teachers, diplomats, and administrators of both church and state. The educational foundation for such professional careers was the study of the liberal arts.

John of Salisbury ON THE LIBERAL ARTS

The standard curriculum of medieval schools was based on intensive study of the seven liberal arts divided into two programs: the *trivium*, consisting of Latin grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (or logic), and the *quadrivium*, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. The brilliant, twelfth-

century scholar and churchman John of Salisbury (c. 1115–1180) wrote the *Metalogicon*, a defense of the liberal arts curriculum, which was under attack from conservative theologians.

WHY SOME ARTS ARE CALLED "LIBERAL"

While there are many sorts of arts, the first to proffer their services to the natural abilities of those who philosophize are the liberal arts. All of the latter are included in the courses of the Trivium and Quadrivium. The liberal arts are said to have become so efficacious among our ancestors, who studied them diligently, that they enabled them to comprehend everything they read, elevated their understanding to all things, and empowered them to cut through the knots of all problems possible of solution. Those to whom the system of the Trivium has disclosed the significance of all words, or the rules of the Quadrivium have unveiled the secrets of all nature, do not need the help of a teacher in order to understand the meaning of books and to find the solutions of questions. They (the branches of learning included in the Trivium and Quadrivium) are called "arts" because they . . . strengthen minds to apprehend the ways of wisdom. . . . They are called "liberal," either because the ancients took care to have their children instructed in them; or because their object is to effect man's liberation, so that, freed from cares, he may devote himself to wisdom. More often than not, they liberate us from cares incompatible with wisdom. They often even free us from worry about (material) necessities, so that the mind may have still greater liberty to apply itself to philosophy.

Among all the liberal arts, the first is logic, and specifically that part of logic which gives initial instruction about words. . . . [T]he word "logic" has a broad meaning, and is not restricted exclusively to the science of argumentative reasoning. (It includes) Grammar (which) is "the science of speaking and writing

correctly—the starting point of all liberal studies." Grammar is the cradle of all philosophy, and in a manner of speaking, the first nurse of the whole study of letters. It takes all of us as tender babes, newly born from nature's bosom. It nurses us in our infancy, and guides our every forward step in philosophy. With motherly care, it fosters and protects the philosopher from the start to the finish (of his pursuits). It is called "grammar" from the basic elements of writing and speaking. *Grama* means a letter or line. . . .

THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING GRAMMAR

[It] is clear that (the function of) grammar is not narrowly confined to one subject. Rather, grammar prepares the mind to understand everything that can be taught in words. Consequently, everyone can appreciate how much all other studies depend on grammar. . . . Gaius [Julius] Caesar [100–44 B.C.] wrote books *On Analogy*, conscious that, without grammar, one cannot master philosophy (with which he was thoroughly familiar) or eloquence (in which he was most proficient). Quintilian [A.D. 35–c. 100] also praises this art to the point of declaring that we should continue the use of grammar and the love of reading "not merely during our school days, but to the very end of our life." For grammar equips us both to receive and to impart knowledge. It modulates our accent, and regulates our very voice so that it is suited to all persons and matters. Poetry should be recited in one way; prose in another.

. . . [Grammar] is . . . the key to everything written as well as the mother and arbiter of all speech. . . .

WHAT IS A SCHOLAR?

In the next selection, the vocation of the medieval scholar and his duties are summarized in a dialogue that was used in medieval schools.

- Are you a scholar?
—Yes.
—What is a scholar?
—Somebody who earnestly and diligently applies himself to the virtues.
—Where are you a scholar?
—Here, everywhere and in every seemly place.
—How many seemly places are there?
—Four: the church, the school, at home with my parents and in the company of orderly men.
—How many unseemly places are there?
—They too are four in number: the dance-floor, the brothel, public roads and inns not frequented by orderly men. More places could be added to this list.
—Are you a scholar?
—Yes.
—What kind of scholar are you?
—As God has created me.
- How many duties does a scholar have?
—Six.
—What are they?
—To get up early, dress immediately, comb my hair, wash my hands, pray to God and go willingly to school.
—Are you a scholar?
—Yes.
—What is the substance of a scholar?
—An animated physical substance susceptible of knowledge and virtue.
—Are you a human being?
—Yes.
—What is a human being?
—A corporal, physical, rational and mortal substance created by God to attain immortal life.
—What is God?
—The best and highest conceivable being who endows everything with its existence and life.

Geoffrey Chaucer AN OXFORD CLERIC

In his masterpiece, *The Canterbury Tales*, English poet and diplomat Geoffrey Chaucer (c. 1340–1400) describes a typical student on pilgrimage to the shrine of Saint Thomas Becket in Canterbury.

An *Oxford Cleric*, still a student though,
One who had taken logic long ago,
Was there; his horse was thinner than a rake,

And he was not too fat, I undertake,
But had a hollow look, a sober stare.
The thread upon his overcoat was bare;

He had found no preferment [employment] in the church

And he was too unworldly to make search For secular employment. By his bed

He preferred having twenty books, in red And black, of Aristotle's philosophy,

To having fine clothes, fiddle, or psaltery [a book of Psalms used for daily prayer].

Though a philosopher, as I have told,

He had not found the stone for making gold.¹

Whatever money from his friends he took

He spent on learning or another book

And prayed for them most earnestly, returning Thanks to them thus for paying for his learning.

His only care was study, and indeed

He never spoke a word more than was need,

Formal at that, respectful in the extreme,

Short, to the point, and lofty in this theme.

The thought of moral virtue filled his speech

And he would gladly learn, and gladly teach.

¹The *philosopher's stone* was the name given to the mythical substance, searched for by alchemists, that would turn base metals into gold.

STUDENT LETTERS

The relationship between fathers and their sons enrolled at universities has not changed all that much since the Middle Ages, as the letters that follow demonstrate.

FATHERS TO SONS

I

I have recently discovered that you live dissolutely and slothfully, preferring license to restraint and play to work and strumming a guitar while the others are at their studies, whence it happens that you have read but one volume of law while your more industrious companions have read several. Wherefore I have decided to exhort you herewith to repent utterly of your dissolute and careless ways, that you may no longer be called a waster and your shame may be turned to good repute.

II

I have learned—not from your master, although he ought not to hide such things from me, but from a certain trustworthy source—that you do not study in your room or act in the schools as a good student should, but play and wander about, disobedient to your master and indulging in sport and in certain other dishonorable practices which I do not now care to explain by letter.

SONS TO FATHERS

I

"Well-beloved father, I have not a penny, nor can I get any save through you, for all things at the University are so dear: nor can I study in my Code or my Digest, for they are all tattered. Moreover, I owe ten crowns in dues to the Provost, and can find no man to lend them to me; I send you word of greetings and of money.

The Student hath need of many things if he will profit here; his father and his kin must needs supply him freely, that he be not compelled to pawn his books, but have ready money in his purse, with gowns and furs and decent clothing, or he will be damned for a beggar; wherefore, that men may not take me for a beast, I send you word of greetings and of money.

Wines are dear, and hostels, and other good things; I owe in every street, and am hard bested to free myself from such snares. Dear father, deign to help me! I fear to be excommunicated; already have I been cited, and there is not even a dry bone in my larder. If I find not the money before this feast of Easter, the church door will be shut in my face: wherefore

grant my supplication, for I send you word of greetings and of money.

L'ENVOY

Well-beloved father, to ease my debts contracted at the tavern, at the baker's, with the doctor and the bedells [a minor college official], and to pay my subscriptions to the laundress and the barber, I send you word of greetings and of money."

II

Sing unto the Lord a new song, praise him with

stringed instruments and organs, rejoice upon the high-sounding cymbals, for your son has held a glorious disputation, which was attended by a great number of teachers and scholars. He answered all questions without a mistake, and no one could get the better of him or prevail against his arguments. Moreover he celebrated a famous banquet, at which both rich and poor were honoured as never before, and he has duly begun to give lectures which are already so popular that others' classrooms are deserted and his own are filled.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What meaning does John of Salisbury give to the word *liberal* in his discussion of liberal arts?
2. Is there any connection between modern learning and the fostering of virtuous citizens? Explain.
3. How do medieval scholars resemble their modern counterparts? How do they differ?

7 ❖ The Jews in the Middle Ages

Toward the end of the eleventh century, small communities of Jews were living in many of the larger towns of Christian Europe. Most of these Jews were descended from Jewish inhabitants of the Roman Empire. Under the protection of the Roman law or of individual Germanic Kings, they had managed to survive amid a sometimes hostile Christian population. But religious fanaticism unleashed by the call for the First Crusade undermined Christian-Jewish relations gravely. Bands of Crusaders began systematically to attack and massacre the Jewish inhabitants of Rhineland towns. Thousands were killed—many because they refused to become converts to Christianity; their houses were looted and burned. Efforts by the bishops and civil authorities to protect their Jewish subjects were largely ineffective. Anti-Semitism became endemic in Latin Christendom.

Albert of Aix-la-Chapelle

MASSACRE OF THE JEWS OF MAINZ

In the next reading, Albert, a twelfth-century priest of the city of Aix-la-Chapelle, describes the massacre of Jews (1096) at the beginning of the First Crusade.